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Browse by hub: AI agent threats · Conventional watchlist · OWASP Agentic Top 10

Showing 5 of 5 threats

NemoClawOllamalocalhost-exposureCSRFmodel-poisoningdriveby-attacklocal-inferenceagent-securityASI04 · Agentic Supply ChainAML.T0018AML.T0020AML.T0043Surface: ModelPropagation: Single Hop

Researchers at Oasis Security found that a malicious webpage can reach an unauthenticated local Ollama instance running behind NVIDIA NemoClaw and use it to implant hidden instructions into the AI model itself. This effectively lets a remote attacker who only controls a webpage a victim visits achieve persistent, unauthenticated tampering with a locally hosted AI agent's behavior.

memory-poisoninglong-term-memoryRAGprovenancecontent-screeningLongMemEvalresearch-findingretrieval-augmented-generationASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0018AML.T0020Surface: MemoryPropagation: Single Hop

This is an academic research paper (not an active exploit) demonstrating that persistent agent memory systems are highly vulnerable to simple, plainly worded false statements: poisoning just 1.2% of a memory corpus dropped answer accuracy from 0.85 to 0.30. The authors show that both write-time content screening and provenance-weighted retrieval defenses fail to catch these low-effort attacks, exposing a fundamental architectural gap rather than a specific software bug.

langflowfaissvector-storememory-poisoningcross-tenantmulti-tenancyinformation-disclosureragASI04 · Agentic Supply ChainSurface: MemoryPropagation: Single Hop

A vulnerability in IBM Langflow OSS (versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.1) allows an attacker to reuse another user's FAISS vector namespace, exposing owner-only embedded content and enabling persistent poisoning of future query results. This creates cross-user data leakage and an ongoing integrity risk in shared or multi-tenant Langflow deployments where vector stores back retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) agents.

prompt-injectionadversarial-imagecross-model-attackmemory-toolindirect-injectionclaudechatgptmultimodalASI03 · Identity SpoofingAML.T0051AML.T0054Surface: MemoryPropagation: Single Hop

A researcher demonstrated that an image generated by ChatGPT could act as a carrier for an indirect prompt injection that hijacked Claude Opus 4.7's memory tool, causing it to persist false memories into future conversations. This shows that even hardened, reasoning-heavy models remain vulnerable to multimodal adversarial inputs crafted using puzzle-like framing to bypass safety reasoning.

ASI06 · Memory PoisoningSurface: MemoryPropagation: Single Hop

Attackers seed false facts or standing instructions into an agent's long-term memory or RAG store, quietly steering decisions across future sessions long after the original malicious input is gone.