Threat Library

Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 contain a path traversal flaw in the SaveToFileComponent that lets an authenticated, low-privileged user write files to arbitrary locations on the server via the /api/v1/run/{flow_id} endpoint. This is a classic input validation failure in an agent-building tool component rather than a novel agentic attack, but it can be leveraged to escalate into further server compromise depending on deployment. Severity is moderate due to the authentication requirement, but risk increases sharply in multi-tenant or exposed Langflow deployments.

A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists in the Playground chat interface of IBM Langflow OSS, a popular framework for building LLM/agent workflows. An attacker could inject malicious script content that executes in the browser of another user viewing the chat, potentially hijacking sessions or performing actions on their behalf within the Langflow UI.

IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 contain a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that allows an authenticated attacker to make the server send unauthorized requests to internal or external systems. This could be used for internal network reconnaissance or as a stepping stone for further attacks, but requires authentication and has moderate severity per its CVSS score of 4.3.

Langflow OSS, a framework used to build AI agent and LLM workflows, contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability caused by incomplete SSRF protections. An attacker able to supply URLs or trigger outbound requests through Langflow components could force the server to reach internal or restricted network resources.

Flowise, a popular low-code LLM/agent orchestration platform, returns decrypted credential secrets in plaintext via its credentials API because its redaction logic only masks fields explicitly typed as 'password', missing string-typed fields that commonly hold database URLs, private keys, and API keys. Any authenticated user with 'credentials:view' permission can retrieve full secrets for connection strings, cloud service accounts, and other integrations configured in the workspace, enabling lateral movement into downstream systems the agent platform connects to.

Pydantic AI's protection against SSRF to cloud metadata endpoints can be bypassed when an application allows local/private URL downloads, because the IP blocklist fails to recognize IPv6-encoded forms (IPv4-mapped, 6to4, NAT64) of metadata service addresses. On dual-stack or NAT64-translated networks, this lets an attacker-controlled URL reach the cloud metadata service and potentially steal short-lived IAM credentials. This only affects apps that explicitly opt into 'force_download=allow-local' on URLs influenced by untrusted input; the issue has been patched in version 1.99.0.

A REST endpoint in the n8n workflow automation platform is registered before authentication middleware is applied, letting any unauthenticated network caller cancel another user's active test webhook if they know the workflow ID. The impact is limited to disrupting in-progress test sessions; production webhooks and stored data are unaffected. This is a low-complexity availability/harassment issue rather than a data breach or compromise vector.

n8n's JavaScript task runner shared a single module cache across all users' Code-node executions on the same instance, allowing one user to poison a cached module and affect other users' automations. This is a multi-tenant isolation failure rather than a sandbox escape or remote code execution, but it can compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability of other tenants' workflow logic.

n8n, a workflow automation platform commonly used to orchestrate AI agent and API integrations, incorrectly embedded the full PEM private key of a Google Service Account inside the 'kid' field of a JWT header instead of a key identifier. Because JWT headers are only Base64-encoded (not encrypted), any system that logged, proxied, or inspected these tokens could recover the private key and impersonate the service account against Google Cloud resources. This is a genuine credential-exposure vulnerability with a clear patch, not a novel agentic-AI attack technique, but it is highly relevant to agent pipelines that rely on n8n for tool/API orchestration.

A concurrency flaw in IBM Cognos Analytics' Agentic AI assistant causes incorrect report summaries or processing failures when multiple authenticated users submit report tasks at the same time. This is a reliability/integrity bug rather than an exploitable attacker-controlled takeover primitive, though it could be leveraged to degrade service or corrupt report outputs relied on for decision-making.

This is an academic survey (SoK) that reviews and categorizes 39 existing papers on execution-layer security for AI coding agents, rather than describing a novel exploit or active campaign. It highlights systemic weaknesses across the field—such as high denylist bypass rates, unaddressed TOCTOU races, and fragmented treatment of MCP threats—and references four previously disclosed, already-patched CVEs. Severity is low-to-medium as a direct threat signal since no new vulnerability or attack technique is disclosed; its value is as a roadmap of known/likely weak points defenders should prioritize.