OWASP Agentic Top 10 · ASI07

Insecure Inter-Agent Communication

Agent-to-agent messages are spoofed or hijacked.

What it is

Multi-agent systems pass natural-language messages between agents, often over protocols that are younger than the agents themselves. Insecure inter-agent communication covers unauthenticated or unencrypted channels, spoofed messages, and payloads that ride from one agent to the next — the transport layer for agent worms.

How it shows up

An attacker on the network injects a message that looks like it came from the orchestrator. A compromised agent forwards an injected instruction to every peer. An agent-to-agent discovery endpoint is spoofed to redirect traffic to a malicious agent.

How to defend against it

Authenticate and sign every inter-agent message, treat peer output as untrusted input, enforce schemas on structured messages, and rate-limit and monitor fan-out so a single compromised agent cannot reach the whole system.

Related threat types: Inter-Agent Communication, Agent Worms, Protocol Vulnerabilities

Threats currently tracked under ASI07

Showing 1–7 of 7 threats, newest first

SSRFMCPMCPHubIPv6NAT646to4Teredointernal-network-accessfilter-bypassASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

MCPHub, a centralized management hub for MCP servers, has an incomplete SSRF guard that fails to block IPv6 transition addresses like NAT64, 6to4, and Teredo. An attacker who can supply a URL for an MCP server connection can embed a private IPv4 address inside one of these IPv6 formats to bypass the filter and reach internal infrastructure. This is a classic SSRF filter evasion issue, patched in version 1.0.32.

Updated Sep 1, 2026

langflowa2arceunauthenticatedagent-frameworkcritical-vulnerabilityASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: ProtocolPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 contain a critical flaw in the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) public endpoint that fails to properly enforce security restrictions, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. With a CVSS score of 9.8, this is a severe, easily exploitable vulnerability that could grant full control of the affected system.

Updated Aug 29, 2026 · CVSS 9.8

MCPDNS-rebindingSSRFlocalhost-exposureHTTP-transportmisconfigurationASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: ProtocolPropagation: Single Hop

pg-aiguide's MCP HTTP transport failed to enable a built-in DNS-rebinding protection option, allowing a malicious webpage to rebind a domain to the local server's address and issue unauthorized requests to the locally running MCP server via a victim's browser. This effectively bypasses the localhost trust boundary that MCP servers typically rely on for security. The issue was a configuration oversight rather than a missing SDK feature, and is fixed in version 0.5.1 by explicitly enabling the allow-list.

Updated Aug 29, 2026 · CVSS 6.8

mcp-godns-rebindingssrfhost-headerlocalhost-bypasscorsstreamable-httpssecve-2026-81092ASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsAML.T0025AML.T0053Surface: ProtocolPropagation: Single Hop

mcp-go's HTTP transports failed to validate the Host header on loopback-bound requests, allowing a malicious webpage in a user's browser to use DNS rebinding to reach a local MCP server and invoke its tools or read its resources. This breaks the security assumption that only trusted local software can talk to a loopback-bound MCP server. The issue is fixed in 0.56.0 via strict host validation.

Updated Aug 29, 2026 · CVSS 6.8

SSRFwebhookMCPcloud-metadatassrfProtection-bypassscheduled-deliveryLightdashASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Lightdash's scheduled delivery feature lets a user-supplied webhook URL be posted to directly by the GoogleChat and MicrosoftTeams clients without applying the existing SSRF protection used for MCP server URLs. This allows an authenticated user to force the server to make requests to internal, loopback, or cloud metadata endpoints and infer reachability from logged error responses. It is a classic SSRF issue in a webhook delivery path rather than an attack on agent reasoning or an AI-specific exploit, though it touches the same URL-validation utility used to secure MCP server connections.

Updated Aug 21, 2026 · CVSS 6.4

CORSDNS-rebindinglocal-apiMCPunauthenticated-accessjantrusted-host-bypassASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: ProtocolPropagation: Single Hop

Jan's local API server (through v0.8.4) mishandles trusted host configuration, replacing user-defined allowed origins with a wildcard that reflects any origin while still allowing credentials. This lets a network-adjacent or DNS-rebinding attacker reach the unauthenticated OpenAI-compatible API to run inference, enumerate models, invoke MCP tools, and read cross-origin responses. Fixed in commit 3e1c1e7; upgrade is the primary remediation.

Updated Jul 24, 2026 · CVSS 6.3

ASI01 · Goal HijackingASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: Inter Agent CommsPropagation: Self Propagating

Adversarial instructions planted in content processed by one agent can replicate into its outputs and infect downstream agents, spreading through normal inter-agent messaging the way the Morris II research worm spread through AI email assistants.

Updated Jul 3, 2026