highAgent ThreatPrivilege Abuse

Langflow Chroma Vector Store Namespace Collision Cross-Tenant Data Leak

First seen Jul 31, 2026 · Updated Jul 31, 2026 · CVSS 8.1

langflowchromavector-storenamespace-collisionmulti-tenancydata-leakragmemory-poisoningASI04 · Agentic Supply ChainSurface: MemoryPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow OSS fails to enforce per-user isolation of Chroma vector store collections, allowing any authenticated attacker to guess or reuse another user's persist_directory and collection_name to read their private documents. The same flaw lets an attacker write poisoned documents into the victim's namespace, corrupting the data that victim's RAG workflows retrieve on. This is a straightforward multi-tenancy authorization failure rather than a novel agentic exploit, but it directly compromises confidentiality and integrity of agent memory.

Technical Analysis

Langflow lets users define flows that reference a Chroma vector store via persist_directory and collection_name parameters, but the application does not scope these identifiers to the owning user or tenant, and does not verify flow ownership before granting access to the underlying collection. An attacker who knows or brute-forces these naming values can construct their own flow pointing at the same physical Chroma collection, causing Langflow's retrieval nodes to return the victim's stored embeddings/documents directly in the attacker's workflow output. Because writes are similarly unauthenticated at the namespace level, the attacker can also insert or overwrite documents in the shared collection, effectively poisoning the memory store any downstream agent or RAG pipeline reads from. The entry point is the flow-authoring/API layer; the boundary crossed is user/tenant isolation within a shared vector database backend, not a sandbox or model boundary.

Affected Systems

IBM Langflow OSS

Detection Signatures

  • Multiple distinct user accounts referencing identical persist_directory + collection_name pairs in flow configs
  • Unexpected documents appearing in a Chroma collection not authored by the collection owner
  • Retrieval node output containing content/metadata not present in the querying user's uploaded documents
  • Audit logs showing cross-user access to the same underlying Chroma storage path without corresponding flow-sharing permissions

Remediation Steps

  1. 1

    Upgrade Langflow

    Apply the vendor patch for CVE-2026-13444 as soon as it is released; track IBM Langflow security advisories for the fixed version beyond 1.10.1.

  2. 2

    Enforce per-tenant namespace scoping

    Derive persist_directory/collection_name deterministically from an authenticated user or tenant ID server-side, rather than trusting user-supplied values, so collisions are impossible.

  3. 3

    Add ownership checks on vector store access

    Verify flow/collection ownership at both read and write time before allowing Chroma queries or inserts, independent of the naming values supplied in the flow definition.

  4. 4

    Audit existing collections

    Review current Chroma storage for shared/colliding namespaces across users and rotate or re-isolate any collections found to be commingled.

  5. 5

    Monitor for poisoning

    Add integrity checks (hashing, provenance metadata) on stored documents to detect unauthorized insertions into vector collections.

CVE / Advisory IDs

CVE-2026-13444

Industries Most Exposed

Software/SaaSFinancial ServicesHealthcareTechnologyAny multi-tenant RAG deployment

Sources

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