Grafana MCP Server Confused Deputy SSRF & Token Exfiltration
First seen Jul 15, 2026 · Updated Jul 15, 2026 · CVSS 8.6
An unauthenticated attacker can abuse the Grafana MCP Server by injecting a crafted X-Grafana-URL header, tricking the server into acting as a proxy that leaks its own privileged Grafana service-account token. This same flaw allows server-side request forgery against internal networks and cloud metadata endpoints, giving attackers a path to full credential theft and internal reconnaissance without needing any prior authentication.
Technical Analysis
The MCP server trusts a client-controlled header (X-Grafana-URL) to determine which backend Grafana instance to contact, rather than validating it against a fixed, server-configured endpoint. Because the server attaches its own environment-configured service-account token to outbound requests regardless of destination, an attacker can redirect those authenticated requests to an attacker-controlled host or to internal-only services (including cloud instance metadata IP ranges like 169.254.169.254), causing the token and any metadata-derived credentials to be exfiltrated or internal services to be probed. This is a classic confused-deputy pattern: the MCP server has more privilege than the untrusted caller and fails to distinguish between requests it should authorize with its own credentials versus attacker-supplied targets. The entry point is the MCP tool-call interface itself, meaning any downstream AI agent orchestrating calls through this server inherits and propagates the compromised trust boundary, and the attacker crosses from the agent/tool layer directly into cloud infrastructure and network segmentation.
Affected Systems
Grafana MCP Server; protocols: MCP
Detection Signatures
- Outbound requests from MCP server process to non-Grafana / unexpected hosts
- Presence of X-Grafana-URL header pointing to non-allowlisted domains or link-local addresses (e.g., 169.254.169.254)
- Unauthenticated inbound requests immediately followed by server-account-token-bearing outbound calls
- Unexpected egress traffic to cloud metadata service IP ranges
- MCP server logs showing target URL mismatch against configured Grafana instance
Remediation Steps
- 1
Patch to fixed Grafana MCP Server version
Upgrade immediately to the vendor-released version that validates or removes client-controlled destination headers.
- 2
Enforce strict allowlisting of backend URL
Configure the MCP server to only ever contact a hardcoded/allowlisted Grafana instance, ignoring or rejecting any client-supplied host override headers.
- 3
Block metadata endpoint access
Apply network-level egress controls (e.g., IMDSv2 enforcement, firewall rules) preventing the MCP server host from reaching cloud metadata IPs.
- 4
Rotate exposed service-account tokens
Rotate any Grafana service-account tokens configured in affected MCP server environments and audit for signs of prior misuse.
- 5
Require authentication on MCP endpoints
Ensure the MCP server requires authenticated, authorized callers before processing any request, and log/alert on anomalous header usage.
CVE / Advisory IDs
Industries Most Exposed
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