IBM Langflow MCP Server Configuration Command Injection
First seen Aug 5, 2026 · Updated Aug 5, 2026 · CVSS 8.8
IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 contain a vulnerability where the 'command' field in MCP server configurations is not properly validated, allowing a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This is a genuine and serious flaw since it turns a legitimate agent-tooling feature (MCP server setup) into a direct code execution path, though it does require prior authentication to exploit.
Technical Analysis
Langflow allows users to configure MCP servers, including specifying a launch command that the platform executes to start the server process. Because the command field is not sanitized or restricted, an authenticated attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands or arguments into this configuration, which are then executed by the Langflow backend with the privileges of the Langflow process. This crosses a trust boundary: MCP server configuration is meant to define trusted tool integrations for the agent, but the lack of input validation lets it become an arbitrary command execution primitive. The entry point is the Langflow UI/API used to create or edit MCP server entries, and the impact is full host compromise, lateral movement to connected systems, and potential poisoning of any agents relying on that Langflow instance for tool orchestration.
Affected Systems
IBM Langflow; protocols: MCP
Detection Signatures
- Unexpected shell metacharacters (;, |, &&, $(), backticks) in MCP server 'command' configuration fields
- MCP server configs created or modified by low-privileged authenticated users shortly before anomalous process spawning
- Langflow backend process spawning unexpected child processes (bash, sh, curl, wget, nc) correlated with MCP server config changes
- Audit logs showing MCP server creation/edit API calls followed by outbound network connections from the Langflow host
Remediation Steps
- 1
Upgrade Langflow
Update IBM Langflow OSS to a patched version beyond 1.10.3 once available and verify the fix addresses command field validation.
- 2
Restrict MCP configuration privileges
Limit which authenticated roles/users can create or modify MCP server configurations to trusted administrators only.
- 3
Input validation and sandboxing
Enforce strict allow-listing or schema validation on the command field, and run MCP server processes in a sandboxed/restricted environment (e.g., containerized, non-root, with seccomp/AppArmor profiles).
- 4
Audit existing configurations
Review all existing MCP server configurations in deployed Langflow instances for suspicious or unexpected command strings.
- 5
Network and host monitoring
Monitor Langflow hosts for unexpected outbound connections or child process creation tied to MCP server management actions.
CVE / Advisory IDs
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