IBM Langflow OSS Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Improper Code Generation Control
First seen Aug 29, 2026 · Updated Aug 29, 2026 · CVSS 8.8
IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 contain a vulnerability that allows a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code due to improper control over code generation. This affects a widely used low-code framework for building AI agent workflows, meaning any authenticated user could potentially compromise the underlying host or downstream agent components.
Technical Analysis
Langflow is a visual builder for LangChain-based agent and LLM pipelines that dynamically generates and executes code (e.g., custom component code, Python snippets) based on user-supplied flow definitions. The flaw arises from improper control of code generation, meaning attacker-supplied input used to construct executable code is not adequately sanitized or sandboxed. A remote authenticated attacker with access to the Langflow UI or API can craft a malicious flow/component definition that results in arbitrary code execution on the server hosting Langflow. Because Langflow orchestrates agent tool chains and LLM pipelines, successful exploitation could allow the attacker to pivot into any connected tools, credentials, or downstream agents accessible from the Langflow server, effectively crossing from a low-privilege authenticated UI session into full host-level compromise.
Affected Systems
IBM Langflow OSS, LangChain
Detection Signatures
- Unexpected process spawning (e.g., python, bash, sh) originating from the langflow service process
- Anomalous outbound network connections initiated shortly after flow creation/execution API calls
- Audit logs showing custom component or code-execution endpoints invoked by non-admin authenticated users
- Unusual file writes or modifications in langflow component/plugin directories
- Repeated POST requests to flow/component creation endpoints with embedded shell metacharacters or eval/exec patterns
Remediation Steps
- 1
Upgrade Langflow
Update IBM Langflow OSS to a patched version beyond 1.11.1 as soon as it is released by the vendor.
- 2
Restrict authenticated access
Limit which users can create or execute custom flows/components; apply least-privilege role separation between flow designers and administrators.
- 3
Sandbox code execution
Run Langflow's code-generation and execution components in an isolated, restricted sandbox (e.g., containerized with no host network/filesystem access) to contain any exploitation.
- 4
Monitor and audit
Enable detailed logging of flow/component creation and execution, and monitor for anomalous process or network activity from the Langflow host.
- 5
Network segmentation
Isolate Langflow deployments from sensitive internal systems and credentials to limit blast radius if code execution occurs.
CVE / Advisory IDs
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