n8n-MCP Multi-Tenant Workflow Backup Scope Isolation Failure
First seen Jul 16, 2026 · Updated Jul 16, 2026 · CVSS 4.2
A flaw in n8n-MCP's multi-tenant HTTP mode allowed an authenticated tenant to access or delete workflow-version backups belonging to the default scope rather than being confined to their own tenant. This could expose or destroy legacy backup data left over from prior single-tenant deployments or migrations. The issue is fixed in version 2.57.4.
Technical Analysis
n8n-MCP exposes an MCP server that lets AI assistants query and manipulate n8n workflow documentation and version data. When ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true, the server failed to properly enforce tenant scoping on workflow_versions backup resources, allowing an authenticated tenant-scoped caller (including an AI agent acting on a tenant's behalf) to read or delete backups belonging to the default/global scope instead of being restricted to their own tenant namespace. This is a broken access control / tenant isolation flaw at the tool layer of an MCP server, meaning any agent with valid but limited credentials could escalate its effective data-access boundary without further exploitation steps. The impact is confined to data exposure and destruction of workflow backups rather than code execution, but in migrated or legacy multi-tenant deployments this could destroy the only available recovery point for critical automation workflows.
Affected Systems
n8n-MCP; protocols: MCP
Detection Signatures
- Requests to workflow_versions or backup-related MCP endpoints referencing tenant IDs other than the caller's own
- Audit logs showing default-scope backup reads/deletes from authenticated non-default tenants
- ENABLE_MULTI_TENANT=true deployments running n8n-MCP versions prior to 2.57.4
- Unexpected deletion or download of legacy/default-scope workflow_versions backups
Remediation Steps
- 1
Upgrade n8n-MCP
Update to n8n-MCP version 2.57.4 or later, which fixes the tenant scoping enforcement for workflow_versions backups.
- 2
Audit backup access logs
Review historical access and deletion logs for workflow_versions backups to identify any cross-tenant access that may have already occurred.
- 3
Restrict multi-tenant migrations
When migrating from single-tenant to multi-tenant deployments, explicitly reassign or purge default-scope backups rather than leaving them accessible under the new multi-tenant configuration.
- 4
Enforce least privilege for agent credentials
Ensure AI assistant/agent credentials used against the MCP server are scoped tightly per tenant and validate that scope enforcement is tested as part of deployment CI/CD.
CVE / Advisory IDs
Industries Most Exposed
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