LiteLLM Skills Archive Path Traversal Arbitrary File Write
First seen Jul 23, 2026 · Updated Jul 23, 2026
LiteLLM's Skills feature fails to validate file paths when extracting uploaded ZIP archives, allowing an authenticated user with access to the Skills API to write files outside the intended directory. This 'zip-slip' style vulnerability could lead to arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution depending on server configuration. The issue is fixed in version 1.83.7-stable.
Technical Analysis
The vulnerability is a classic path traversal (zip-slip) flaw in LiteLLM's Skills archive extraction logic, where ZIP entry names containing sequences like '../../' are not sanitized before being used to construct extraction file paths. The entry point is the `/v1/skills` upload endpoint, accessible to authenticated users or API keys whose `allowed_routes` include skills-related routes (`/v1/skills`, `anthropic_routes`, `llm_api_routes`). An attacker gains the ability to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations reachable by the LiteLLM process, which could overwrite configuration files, cron jobs, application code, or startup scripts to achieve code execution. This crosses the tool/agent boundary because Skills are packaged executable capabilities loaded into the LLM gateway's runtime, meaning a malicious archive uploaded through a routine API interaction can compromise the underlying host or proxy infrastructure that mediates all LLM traffic.
Affected Systems
LiteLLM
Detection Signatures
- ZIP archive entries containing path traversal sequences (e.g., '../', '..\\', absolute paths) in filenames
- Unexpected file writes outside designated skills staging/extraction directories on LiteLLM hosts
- POST requests to /v1/skills from unexpected or low-privilege API keys
- File integrity monitoring alerts on config files, cron directories, or startup scripts following skill uploads
- Log entries showing skill archive processing errors or unusual extraction paths
Remediation Steps
- 1
Upgrade LiteLLM
Update to litellm 1.83.7-stable or later, which fixes the path traversal validation in Skills archive extraction.
- 2
Restrict Skills API access
Limit which users and API keys have allowed_routes including /v1/skills, anthropic_routes, or llm_api_routes to only trusted, minimal-privilege accounts.
- 3
Block endpoint at gateway
If upgrading is not immediately possible, block POST /v1/skills at the reverse proxy or API gateway layer.
- 4
Sandbox extraction
Ensure skill archive extraction occurs in an isolated, non-privileged directory/container with no write access to sensitive host paths.
- 5
Monitor file system changes
Deploy file integrity monitoring on directories used for skill staging and on critical system paths to detect anomalous writes.
CVE / Advisory IDs
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