criticalAgent ThreatFramework Vulnerability

IBM Langflow MCP Server Configuration Validation Bypass RCE

First seen Jul 18, 2026 · Updated Jul 18, 2026 · CVSS 8.8

langflowmcpremote-code-executionconfig-validationibmagent-frameworkASI04 · Agentic Supply ChainSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a vulnerability allowing remote code execution due to incomplete validation of MCP server configuration files. An attacker who can supply or modify an MCP server config could execute arbitrary code on the Langflow host, fully compromising the agent runtime and any connected tools or data.

Technical Analysis

Langflow integrates with MCP servers by loading configuration files that define server connection parameters and executable commands; insufficient validation of these files allows an attacker to inject unauthorized commands or parameters that Langflow executes when initializing or connecting to the MCP server. The entry point is the MCP server configuration ingestion path, which appears to trust file contents without adequately sanitizing fields that map to command execution or process spawning. Successful exploitation grants the attacker code execution in the context of the Langflow process, crossing the boundary from a configuration/data channel into the tool-execution layer. This effectively turns a supply-chain-adjacent trust relationship (Langflow trusting MCP config files) into a direct RCE primitive, enabling full takeover of the agent host, lateral movement to connected tools, and exposure of any credentials or secrets accessible to that process.

Affected Systems

IBM Langflow; protocols: MCP

Detection Signatures

  • Unexpected process spawning or shell execution originating from the Langflow service process
  • MCP server configuration files loaded from untrusted, writable, or externally-supplied paths
  • Unusual outbound network connections initiated shortly after MCP config load/reload events
  • Langflow logs showing MCP server initialization errors or malformed config fields immediately preceding anomalous activity
  • Config files containing shell metacharacters, unexpected command fields, or path traversal sequences

Remediation Steps

  1. 1

    Upgrade Langflow

    Apply the vendor patch or upgrade to a Langflow version beyond 1.10.0 once IBM releases a fix that enforces strict MCP configuration validation.

  2. 2

    Restrict MCP config sources

    Only allow MCP server configuration files from trusted, access-controlled locations; disallow user-uploaded or externally writable config paths.

  3. 3

    Sandbox Langflow execution

    Run Langflow in a containerized or sandboxed environment with minimal privileges to limit the blast radius of any RCE.

  4. 4

    Validate and monitor configs

    Implement schema validation and allow-listing for MCP config fields, and monitor for anomalous process execution tied to config loading.

  5. 5

    Network segmentation

    Limit outbound network access from the Langflow host to reduce impact if code execution is achieved.

CVE / Advisory IDs

CVE-2026-7755

Industries Most Exposed

TechnologyFinancial ServicesHealthcareGovernmentSoftware Development

Sources

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