IBM Langflow MCP Server Configuration Validation Bypass RCE
First seen Jul 18, 2026 · Updated Jul 18, 2026 · CVSS 8.8
IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a vulnerability allowing remote code execution due to incomplete validation of MCP server configuration files. An attacker who can supply or modify an MCP server config could execute arbitrary code on the Langflow host, fully compromising the agent runtime and any connected tools or data.
Technical Analysis
Langflow integrates with MCP servers by loading configuration files that define server connection parameters and executable commands; insufficient validation of these files allows an attacker to inject unauthorized commands or parameters that Langflow executes when initializing or connecting to the MCP server. The entry point is the MCP server configuration ingestion path, which appears to trust file contents without adequately sanitizing fields that map to command execution or process spawning. Successful exploitation grants the attacker code execution in the context of the Langflow process, crossing the boundary from a configuration/data channel into the tool-execution layer. This effectively turns a supply-chain-adjacent trust relationship (Langflow trusting MCP config files) into a direct RCE primitive, enabling full takeover of the agent host, lateral movement to connected tools, and exposure of any credentials or secrets accessible to that process.
Affected Systems
IBM Langflow; protocols: MCP
Detection Signatures
- Unexpected process spawning or shell execution originating from the Langflow service process
- MCP server configuration files loaded from untrusted, writable, or externally-supplied paths
- Unusual outbound network connections initiated shortly after MCP config load/reload events
- Langflow logs showing MCP server initialization errors or malformed config fields immediately preceding anomalous activity
- Config files containing shell metacharacters, unexpected command fields, or path traversal sequences
Remediation Steps
- 1
Upgrade Langflow
Apply the vendor patch or upgrade to a Langflow version beyond 1.10.0 once IBM releases a fix that enforces strict MCP configuration validation.
- 2
Restrict MCP config sources
Only allow MCP server configuration files from trusted, access-controlled locations; disallow user-uploaded or externally writable config paths.
- 3
Sandbox Langflow execution
Run Langflow in a containerized or sandboxed environment with minimal privileges to limit the blast radius of any RCE.
- 4
Validate and monitor configs
Implement schema validation and allow-listing for MCP config fields, and monitor for anomalous process execution tied to config loading.
- 5
Network segmentation
Limit outbound network access from the Langflow host to reduce impact if code execution is achieved.
CVE / Advisory IDs
Industries Most Exposed
Respond to this threat
Pro subscribers get a full AI-generated incident-response playbook for this threat — detection, containment, eradication, and recovery steps — plus an unlimited AI Threat Advisor for questions about your environment.