MOOS pShare PSHARE_CMD Authorization Bypass

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability stems from pShare's failure to validate the origin or authorization level of PSHARE_CMD messages before acting on cmd=output or cmd=input directives. An attacker with publish access to the MOOS bus can dynamically open new listeners bound to arbitrary addresses or redirect existing bus traffic streams, effectively enabling traffic interception, data exfiltration, or man-in-the-middle manipulation of control and sensor data. Because MOOS is widely used as a middleware layer in autonomous vehicles, robotics, and unmanned systems, exploitation could allow injection of falsified sensor data or hijacking of command channels feeding into higher-level autonomy or AI decision-making modules. The CVSS 9.8 score reflects the low attack complexity, lack of required privileges beyond bus publish access, and the high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For organizations running AI-driven autonomous agents (e.g., robotic control systems, drones, or research platforms) that use MOOS for real-time data exchange, this flaw could allow adversaries to manipulate the data feeding perception or planning models, leading to unsafe or attacker-directed autonomous behavior.

Affected Systems

MOOS essential-moos pShare through version 10.0.1; any robotics, maritime, aerospace, or autonomous vehicle platforms using MOOS-IvP middleware for inter-process communication

Indicators of Compromise

• No specific hashes or IPs published; indicators include anomalous PSHARE_CMD messages with cmd=output/cmd=input parameters, unexpected new listener bindings on MOOS bus hosts, and unauthorized redirection of MOOSDB traffic to unfamiliar IP addresses/ports

Remediation Steps

1. 1

   Upgrade pShare

   Apply vendor patches or upgrade to a version of essential-moos pShare beyond 10.0.1 once available, incorporating proper authorization checks for PSHARE_CMD messages.

2. 2

   Restrict Bus Access

   Limit which hosts/processes can publish to the MOOS bus using network segmentation, firewalling, or VPN tunnels to trusted nodes only.

3. 3

   Implement Authentication Layer

   Add an authentication or cryptographic signing mechanism for MOOSDB command traffic if not natively supported, to prevent unauthorized command injection.

4. 4

   Monitor Listener Configuration

   Continuously monitor pShare listener and route configuration for unexpected changes at runtime, alerting on new or modified output/input bindings.

5. 5

   Network Isolation

   Isolate MOOS-based control networks from external or untrusted networks, especially in autonomous vehicle or robotics deployments where this middleware feeds AI decision systems.