Rapuncel Infostealer Campaign via Fake LastPass Authenticator GitHub Repos

Technical Analysis

The campaign relies on typosquatted or impersonated GitHub repositories tuned for search engine visibility, luring users searching for LastPass Authenticator or similar trusted software into cloning or downloading malicious payloads. Once executed, Rapuncel functions as an information stealer, harvesting credentials, session tokens, browser data, and potentially stored API keys or secrets from the infected host. Because this abuses GitHub's trust model and search discoverability rather than exploiting a specific software vulnerability, no CVE is associated with this campaign. Developers and engineers who clone repositories to build or test AI agent integrations, RAG pipelines, or LLM tool-calling frameworks are at elevated risk, since infostealers of this type commonly exfiltrate cloud provider credentials, LLM API keys, and service tokens stored in local config files or environment variables, enabling downstream compromise of connected AI agent infrastructure.

Affected Systems

Developer workstations and CI/CD environments where users clone or execute code from unverified GitHub repositories impersonating LastPass Authenticator or other trusted software brands; Windows and cross-platform systems where the stealer payload is executed

Indicators of Compromise

• Fake GitHub repositories impersonating LastPass Authenticator
• Rapuncel infostealer payload (specific hashes not disclosed in source)
• SEO-poisoned search results linking to malicious GitHub repos

Remediation Steps

1. 1

   Verify repository authenticity

   Only clone or install software from official vendor-verified GitHub organizations; check star history, commit authenticity, and organization verification badges before use.

2. 2

   Audit developer and CI environments

   Scan developer machines and build pipelines for indicators of Rapuncel infection, including unexpected outbound connections and unauthorized credential access.

3. 3

   Rotate exposed credentials

   Immediately rotate API keys, cloud credentials, and LLM/service tokens on any system suspected of running the malicious repository, especially those used by agent frameworks or automation pipelines.

4. 4

   Restrict secret storage in plaintext

   Use secure vaults or secrets managers instead of storing API keys/tokens in local files or environment variables accessible to arbitrary scripts.

5. 5

   Deploy endpoint detection

   Ensure EDR/AV solutions have updated signatures for Rapuncel and similar infostealer families targeting developer environments.