Wazuh GitHub Actions Shell Injection via Crafted VERSION.json (CVE-2026-67308)

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability stems from unsanitized interpolation of untrusted PR-controlled data (VERSION.json contents) into GitHub Actions run: steps, a classic CI/CD shell injection pattern (similar to CWE-78) rather than a parser or memory-safety bug. An attacker submitting a pull request can inject shell metacharacters (e.g., $(), backticks, ; and |) into environment variables that are later expanded unquoted in bash, resulting in arbitrary command execution within the workflow's runner context. On self-hosted runners this is especially severe because such runners often have access to internal networks, deployment credentials, and long-lived secrets (GITHUB_TOKEN, AWS keys) that can be exfiltrated or used for lateral movement and further supply-chain compromise of downstream artifacts. Wazuh is a widely deployed open-source security monitoring/XDR platform, so a compromised build pipeline could lead to tampered releases or agents. Organizations that use Wazuh's agents or SIEM outputs to feed AI-driven security orchestration, RAG-based alert triage, or autonomous SOC agents should treat any compromised build artifacts or leaked CI credentials as a potential vector for poisoning agent tool inputs or exposing API keys those agents depend on, warranting immediate credential rotation and pipeline validation.

Affected Systems

Wazuh GitHub repository workflows prior to commit 44bf114; GitHub Actions CI/CD pipelines using self-hosted runners; any downstream systems relying on GITHUB_TOKEN or AWS credentials scoped to these workflows

Indicators of Compromise

• VERSION.json (crafted/malicious pull request payload)
• Commit hash prior to: 44bf114
• Suspicious PRs modifying VERSION.json with shell metacharacters ($, `, ;, |, &&)

Remediation Steps

1. 1

   Update to patched workflow version

   Upgrade Wazuh workflow definitions to commit 44bf114 or later, which remediates the shell injection flaw.

2. 2

   Sanitize and quote workflow inputs

   Ensure all PR-controlled data used in GitHub Actions steps is passed via environment variables with proper quoting, or processed through safe scripting (e.g., using actions/github-script) rather than direct shell interpolation.

3. 3

   Rotate exposed credentials

   Immediately rotate GITHUB_TOKEN scopes and any AWS credentials accessible to CI workflows that may have been exposed prior to patching.

4. 4

   Restrict self-hosted runner permissions

   Limit self-hosted runner network access and credential scope, and require manual approval for workflow runs triggered by external pull requests.

5. 5

   Audit recent workflow runs

   Review CI/CD logs and pull request history for anomalous VERSION.json submissions or unexpected command execution in workflow runs.

6. 6

   Enable branch protection and PR review gating

   Require maintainer approval before workflows execute on forked/external pull requests to prevent untrusted code from triggering privileged CI jobs.