Threat Library

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Browse by hub: AI agent threats · Conventional watchlist · OWASP Agentic Top 10

Showing 6 of 6 threats

langflowa2arceunauthenticatedagent-frameworkcritical-vulnerabilityASI07 · Inter-Agent CommsSurface: ProtocolPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.11.1 contain a critical flaw in the Agent-to-Agent (A2A) public endpoint that fails to properly enforce security restrictions, allowing a remote unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. With a CVSS score of 9.8, this is a severe, easily exploitable vulnerability that could grant full control of the affected system.

langflowauthenticationbrute-forceaccount-takeoveragent-frameworkrate-limitingASI08 · Cascading FailuresSurface: Human InterfacePropagation: Single Hop

Langflow, an open-source framework used to visually build LLM/agent workflows, contains a flaw allowing unlimited authentication attempts, enabling remote attackers to brute-force user credentials. Given a 9.1 CVSS score, successful exploitation could grant unauthorized access to accounts controlling agent pipelines, connected tools, and stored credentials/secrets.

path-traversalarbitrary-file-writelangflowapirequestcontent-dispositionunsanitized-inputagent-tool-componentssrf-adjacentASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0010AML.T0048Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Langflow's APIRequest component, when its 'Save to File' feature is enabled, trusts filenames supplied by an external HTTP server's Content-Disposition header without sanitizing them. A malicious or compromised remote endpoint can inject path traversal sequences to write arbitrary files outside the intended temporary directory, potentially leading to full remote code execution on the host running the agent flow.

langflowmcpremote-code-executionconfig-validationibmagent-frameworkASI04 · Agentic Supply ChainSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 contain a vulnerability allowing remote code execution due to incomplete validation of MCP server configuration files. An attacker who can supply or modify an MCP server config could execute arbitrary code on the Langflow host, fully compromising the agent runtime and any connected tools or data.

langflowauthentication-bypassauto-logincorsprivilege-escalationagent-frameworkdefault-configASI02 · Tool MisuseSurface: Human InterfacePropagation: Single Hop

Langflow, a widely used low-code framework for building AI agent workflows, ships with an AUTO_LOGIN feature enabled by default that issues long-lived superuser bearer tokens to any unauthenticated network requester hitting a specific login endpoint. Combined with permissive CORS settings, this allows a remote attacker with no credentials to obtain full administrative control over the Langflow instance, including any agents, flows, and connected tools/credentials it manages. This is a critical, actively exploitable misconfiguration in a default deployment rather than a subtle logic flaw.

ASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: NoneMCP

The MCP Inspector developer tool shipped a proxy that lacked authentication, allowing browser-based attackers to reach it from a malicious web page and execute code on the developer's machine. Reported by Oligo Security with a CVSS score of 9.4.