Cascading Failures

This is an academic systematization-of-knowledge (SoK) paper analyzing 197 prior works on multi-agent LLM system security, not a novel exploit or active threat. It proposes an organizing framework (A-I-R: adversary position, interaction interface, resulting risk) to unify understanding of how attacks propagate across agent boundaries in MAS. Severity is low because this is a research taxonomy/survey with no new attack disclosed, no PoC, and no affected product identified.

Updated Sep 2, 2026

This is an academic defense paper, not a report of an active exploit or vulnerability disclosure. It describes a known class of multi-agent risk where a harmful goal is split into innocuous-looking subtasks so no single agent detects the malicious intent, and proposes SafeFlow, a semantic taint-tracking system to mitigate it. Severity is low because the source is proposing a mitigation, not disclosing a new active threat.

Updated Jul 31, 2026

This is an academic defense paper, not an active exploit report. It describes a known class of multi-agent risk—where a harmful goal is split into innocuous-looking subtasks that evade per-agent safety checks—and proposes SafeFlow, a semantic information-flow control system to detect and block such propagation before irreversible actions occur. Severity is low because the raw data documents a proposed mitigation and evaluated benchmark improvements, not a demonstrated real-world attack or vulnerability in a deployed system.

Updated Jul 29, 2026