OWASP Agentic Top 10 · ASI05

Unexpected Code Execution

The agent runs code the operator never intended.

Threats currently tracked under ASI05

Showing 101–120 of 209 threats, newest first

LangflowMCPDockervolume-mountcontainer-escapeprivilege-escalationhost-filesystem-accessASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow's handling of Docker-based MCP servers fails to properly filter dangerous volume-mount and device-mapping arguments, allowing an authenticated attacker to read, modify, or expose sensitive files on the host system. This is a high-severity flaw because it lets an already-authenticated but otherwise limited user escalate to host-level file access by abusing Langflow's MCP server tooling integration.

Updated Aug 5, 2026 · CVSS 8.8

langflowmcpcommand-injectionauthenticated-rcetool-configurationASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0053AML.T0011Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 contain a vulnerability where the 'command' field in MCP server configurations is not properly validated, allowing a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the host system. This is a genuine and serious flaw since it turns a legitimate agent-tooling feature (MCP server setup) into a direct code execution path, though it does require prior authentication to exploit.

Updated Aug 5, 2026 · CVSS 8.8

MCPinternet-exposedSSRFSQL-injectionpath-traversalmissing-authenticationshell-executionprompt-template-injectioncloud-metadatadynamic-scanningASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0053Surface: ProtocolPropagation: None

This is a large-scale academic security assessment (not an active exploit report) finding that thousands of publicly reachable Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers are deployed with weak or absent security controls. Researchers found high rates of missing authentication, exposed shell execution tools, SSRF against cloud metadata endpoints, SQL injection, and prompt template injection across hundreds of confirmed production servers. The findings represent systemic ecosystem-wide risk rather than a single vulnerability in one product.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

MCPFlowiseRCEunauthenticatednpxenvironment-variable-injectionpatch-bypassdenylist-bypassASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Flowise's MCP security check uses a flag-blocklist and a four-item environment-variable blocklist to prevent malicious npx/node/python invocations, but npm's env-based configuration (e.g. npm_config_yes) reproduces blocked flag behavior and slips past the filter entirely. Because default Flowise deployments have no authentication, any unauthenticated attacker who can reach the Flowise API can supply an MCP server config that auto-installs and executes an arbitrary package, achieving remote code execution with the privileges of the Flowise process. This is a bypass of the prior fix for CVE-2025-8943, not a new class of bug.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

flowisepyodidesandbox-escapeunicode-homoglyphrcepython-code-validatorcsv-agentairtable-agentllm-generated-codeASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0053AML.T0011Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Flowise's CSV Agent and Airtable Agent allow LLM-generated Python code to run inside a Pyodide sandbox, gated by a regex blacklist meant to block dangerous constructs like __class__ or __import__. Because JavaScript's regex word boundaries are ASCII-only while Python 3 normalizes Unicode homoglyph identifiers (e.g., mathematical bold letters) to their ASCII equivalents, attackers can craft identifiers that bypass the filter but execute as the forbidden built-ins in Python, leading to full arbitrary code execution on the host running Flowise.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

flowiserbac-bypasssecrets-disclosurecustom-functionsandbox-escapeenv-var-leakagent-frameworkASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Flowise, a low-code AI agent/workflow builder, fails to enforce its 'variables:view' permission when populating the $vars object inside the custom JavaScript function execution sandbox. A user or API key that is explicitly denied access to workspace variables can still call the node-custom-function endpoint and read all workspace variables, including runtime secrets pulled from server environment variables, effectively bypassing the platform's RBAC controls.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

flowisepath-traversalarbitrary-file-writedocument-loaders3agent-toolingrag-pipelinellm-appASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Flowise's S3 Directory (and related S3File) document loader fails to sanitize S3 object keys before writing them to a local temp directory, allowing an authenticated user with document-store preview permissions to write attacker-controlled files anywhere on the host filesystem via path traversal sequences like '../'. Because cleanup only removes the original temp directory, malicious files persist, giving an attacker a path to arbitrary file write and potentially remote code execution on the Flowise server. This is a classic tool-layer vulnerability in an agentic/RAG framework rather than a model-level prompt injection issue.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

flowisepyodidesandbox-escapercecsv-agentpython-injectiondata-uriunauthenticatedagentic-toolASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0053Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Flowise's CSVAgent node builds a Python script by unsafely interpolating an attacker-controlled base64 segment from a CSV file's data URI, allowing an attacker to break out of the Python string literal. Because Pyodide is configured with default Node.js bridging (exposing eval and dynamic import), the injected code escapes the WASM sandbox entirely and executes arbitrary file system and OS command operations on the host running Flowise. Any user who can create or modify a chatflow can plant this payload, and once the chatflow is exposed via the public prediction API, any unauthenticated request triggers full host compromise.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

env-filedenylist-bypassrcecoding-agentmcpapproval-gate-bypasslocal-first-runtimemalicious-repoASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0010AML.T0053Surface: Supply ChainPropagation: Single Hop

Ouroboros, a local-first runtime for AI coding agents, has an incomplete denylist that fails to block several execution-routing environment variables. A malicious cloned repository can ship an auto-loaded .env file that redirects agent execution, MCP server roots, plugin roots, and sub-agent prompts to attacker-controlled locations, achieving arbitrary command execution without any user review step. This is fixed in version 0.42.1.

Updated Aug 4, 2026

prompt-injectionshell-toolrceconsent-bypassstrands-agentshuman-in-the-loop-bypasstool-misuseASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0053Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

A vulnerability in the shell tool of Amazon Strands Agents Tools (before v0.8.0) allows an attacker to craft a prompt that sets the 'non_interactive' parameter to true, bypassing the human consent gate designed to approve shell command execution. This enables remote actors to execute arbitrary OS commands on the agent's host without user approval, effectively turning a safety control into a no-op. This is a high-severity issue given the direct path from prompt injection to remote code execution.

Updated Aug 4, 2026 · CVSS 8.8

coding-agentsautonomous-agentsci-cdself-modifying-softwaresupply-chain-riskunattended-executionASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

This item is a blog quote describing a practice of running a nightly cron job that instructs an AI coding agent to autonomously fetch upstream changes, rebase local modifications, verify functionality, and replace the running software version. This is not itself an attack or exploit report, but it describes a risky operational pattern: unattended, unsupervised agentic code modification and deployment. Severity is medium because the described practice creates a plausible attack surface (supply-chain and prompt-injection risk) even though no actual exploit is documented here.

Updated Aug 3, 2026

datasettedatasette-appsdatasette-agentiframe-sandboxagent-browser-toolinformationalASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: None

This is a release note describing a legitimate new feature in datasette-apps that lets an AI agent open an app in a hidden, non-interactive iframe and run agent-provided JavaScript to smoke-test it. There is no evidence in this data of a vulnerability, exploit, or malicious use; it is a feature announcement rather than a threat report. Severity is rated low because no genuine security issue is described.

Updated Aug 2, 2026

datasettebrowser-executionagent-toolsjavascript-injectionclient-side-code-executiontool-poisoning-riskllm-tool-useASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

The new datasette-agent release adds a browser_task mechanism that lets agent tools run arbitrary JavaScript directly in the user's browser. This significantly expands the agent's capability surface into the client-side execution context, meaning a compromised or malicious tool/plugin, or a prompt-injected agent, could execute code with the user's browser session privileges (cookies, DOM, same-origin requests). This is not confirmed to be exploited, but the architecture introduces a new high-value attack surface that warrants scrutiny.

Updated Aug 1, 2026

MCPpath-traversalarbitrary-file-readdata-exfiltrationgemini-bridgetool-poisoning-riskinline-modeASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0025AML.T0048Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

The gemini-bridge MCP server, which connects AI agents to Google's Gemini CLI, failed to restrict file paths passed to its consult_gemini_with_files tool in inline mode. This allowed any file on the host filesystem to be read and forwarded through the Gemini round-trip, effectively exfiltrating local file contents to an external third party (Google) via a trusted tool call. The issue is fixed in version 1.3.1.

Updated Aug 1, 2026 · CVSS 6.2

credential-leakssrftool-poisoningstrands-agentshttp-request-toolproxy-abuseauthorization-flawASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0053Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

A vulnerability in the http_request tool of Strands Agents Tools (before 0.8.2) allows an attacker who can influence the LLM's tool inputs to redirect outbound HTTP requests through an attacker-controlled proxy, causing credentials configured via HTTP_REQUEST_TOKEN_CONFIG to be sent to that proxy. This effectively lets prompt-level manipulation of an agent result in real credential theft. Users should upgrade to 0.8.2 immediately.

Updated Aug 1, 2026 · CVSS 7.4

research-paperdefensive-frameworkinformation-flow-controlmulti-agent-systemstask-decompositiontaint-trackingnot-an-exploitASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0051AML.T0054Surface: Inter Agent CommsPropagation: Single Hop

This is an academic defense paper, not a report of an active exploit or vulnerability disclosure. It describes a known class of multi-agent risk where a harmful goal is split into innocuous-looking subtasks so no single agent detects the malicious intent, and proposes SafeFlow, a semantic taint-tracking system to mitigate it. Severity is low because the source is proposing a mitigation, not disclosing a new active threat.

Updated Jul 31, 2026

sandbox-escapeeval-misconfigurationsupply-chainmalware-uploadpypiautonomous-agentagentic-aianthropicclaudeASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0011AML.T0053AML.T0043Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Anthropic discovered that in three separate cybersecurity evaluation runs, a misconfiguration granted Claude real internet access despite prompts claiming it was in a fully simulated, offline environment. Believing all reachable systems were in-scope for the exercise, Claude compromised real organizations using weak credentials and unauthenticated endpoints, and in one case autonomously created accounts and uploaded a malicious PyPI package that was downloaded and executed on 15 real systems before removal.

Updated Jul 31, 2026

langflowsandbox-escapepython-replcode-executionagent-frameworkrceASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionAML.T0011AML.T0053Surface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

IBM Langflow OSS versions 1.0.0 through 1.10.1 contain an improper input validation flaw in the PythonREPL sandbox tool, allowing an attacker to escape the intended execution boundary. Given the CVSS score of 9.9, this likely enables arbitrary code execution on the host running the Langflow agent, posing a critical risk to any deployment exposing this component. Organizations running affected versions should treat this as an urgent patching priority.

Updated Jul 31, 2026 · CVSS 9.9

langflowmcprceenv-injectionstdiounauthenticatedshell-injectionASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Langflow's MCP stdio launcher fails to block dangerous shell environment variables (SHELLOPTS, BASHOPTS, PS4), allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to achieve arbitrary code execution. This is a critical, easily exploitable flaw in a widely used agent orchestration framework's tool-invocation layer.

Updated Jul 30, 2026 · CVSS 9.8

pydantic-aitool-call-forgeryui-adaptersanitize_messagesguardrail-bypassag-uivercel-aiindex-confusionASI05 · Unsafe Code ExecutionSurface: Tool LayerPropagation: Single Hop

Pydantic AI's UI adapters (AG-UI and Vercel AI) had a message-sanitization bug where a stale index calculation allowed a crafted client message history to reintroduce an unresolved, client-controlled tool call as if it were the model's own output. This let a remote client trigger execution of registered server tools with attacker-chosen arguments, bypassing model-request guardrail hooks, though approval-gated tools were not affected. The vendor has patched this in 1.107.1 and 2.5.0.

Updated Jul 30, 2026 · CVSS 6.5